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Abstract
Improving the resistance of deep neural networks
against adversarial attacks is important for deploying
models to realistic applications. Currently, most defense
methods are designed to defend against additive noise
attacks, their performance cannot be guaranteed when
against non-additive noise attacks. In this paper, we fo-
cus on adversarial deformations, a typical class of non-
additive noise attacks, and propose a flow gradient regu-
larization with random start to improve the resistance of
models. Theoretically, we prove that, compared with in-
put gradient regularization, regularizing flow gradients
is able to get a tighter bound.
Across multiple datasets, architectures, and adversarial
deformations, our experimental results consistently in-
dicate that models trained with flow gradient regular-
ization can acquire a better resistance than trained with
input gradient regularization with a large margin. More-
over, compared with adversarial training, our method
can achieve better results in optimization-based and
gradient-free attacks, and combining these two methods
can improve the resistance against deformation attacks
further. Finally, we give a unified form of gradient reg-
ularization, which can be used to derive the correspond-
ing form when facing other types of attack.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs), especially convolutional
neural networks (CNNs), have achieved remarkable suc-
cess in computer vision tasks (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and
Hinton 2012; Simon-Gabriel et al. 2019; Girshick 2015;
Long, Shelhamer, and Darrell 2015). However, small, im-
perceptible changes to the underlying images can easily
fool DNNs (Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2014). Such modified inputs, also known as adver-
sarial examples, pose a doubt when applying deep learning
models to security-sensitive applications, such as face recog-
nition, surveillance, and self-driving cars (Sharif et al. 2016;
Heaven 2019).
Under the criterion that the instances with or without per-
turbations should look similar, there are many ways to per-
form such changes. The most intuitive and widely concerned
one is to add a crafted noise to the original image, where
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Figure 1: Calculating ‖x′ − x‖2 and ‖v − v0‖2 along a
random direction and the adversarial direction generated by
stAdv on CIFAR-10.
the lp-norm of the noise is limited to a small value to en-
sure imperceptible to human vision (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al. 2017; Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017). In addition to additive noise attacks described
above, researchers have been working to find other ways
to cheat deep models. For example, Engstrom et al. (2017)
constructed adversarial examples by rotating and translating
images. Xiao et al. (2018b) proposed stAdv, which attacks
models by shifting the spatial position of each pixel. Brown
et al. (2017) created adversarial image patches that can fool
classifiers in the real world. The diversity in adversarial ex-
amples imposes great challenges to the research on building
adversarial robust models.
Improving resistance to adversarial attacks is impor-
tant for deploying DNNs to realistic applications. In or-
der to achieve this goal, many defenses have come into
the scene, such as adversarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al. 2017; Wang and Zhang
2019), feature squeezing (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017), in-
put gradient regularization (Ross and Doshi-Velez 2018;
Jakubovitz and Giryes 2018; Chan et al. 2019) and certified
defenses (Hein and Andriushchenko 2017; Raghunathan,
Steinhardt, and Liang 2018). One concern is that these de-
fenses mostly focus on additive noise attacks, and their re-
sistance to other types cannot be guaranteed (Engstrom et al.
2017; Xiao et al. 2018b). How to defense non-additive noise
attacks needs more attention.
In this paper, we focus on improving the resistance of
models against adversarial deformations (Xiao et al. 2018b;
Alaifari, Alberti, and Gauksson 2018), a typical class of non-
additive noise attacks. Unlike additive noise attacks, which
fool deep models by perturbing the intensity of each pixel,
adversarial deformations flow the position of each pixel in
clean images Despite resulting in large lp-norm distance, the
generated image can maintain high perceptual quality (Xiao
et al. 2018b).
To resist such deformations, the main principle we fol-
low is that the output of a robust model should be insen-
sitive to a small variation of input, where the key issue is
to design a suitable metric to evaluate the variation. De-
fensive methods adopting the same principle, such as in-
put gradient regularization (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015;
Ross and Doshi-Velez 2018) and Jacobians regularization
(Jakubovitz and Giryes 2018; Hoffman, Roberts, and Yaida
2019), use lp-norm of the difference between the adversar-
ial image x′ and the clean image x, ‖x′ − x‖p, to evaluate
the variation. For additive noise attacks, it is a good and ef-
fective measure. However, it is not completely suitable for
adversarial deformations, as shown in Figure 1(a), where a
shorter direction exists to result in a large lp-norm distance,
thus leads to those defenses built on ‖x′ − x‖p are less ef-
fective in defending against adversarial deformations. It is
worth noting that we only show two directions and in the
real high-dimensional space, the situation will be sharper.
Let us first revisit the form of generating adversarial de-
formations (Xiao et al. 2018b; Alaifari, Alberti, and Gauks-
son 2018). Given a clean image x, an adversary x′ is con-
structed by x′ = I(x,v), where I is the bilinear inter-
polation function and v is the flow matrix that indicates
the offset of each pixel position. The pointwise slope and
the piecewise linear introduced in the process of construct-
ing adversarial deformations, which will be detailed in the
following section, are the main reasons for the above phe-
nomenon. Namely, these two characteristics lead to the in-
correct estimation of the input variation by the methods built
on ‖x′ − x‖p, and finally lead to the discounted defense ef-
fect.
In order to effectively protect deep models from adversar-
ial deformations, in this paper, we propose a flow gradient
regularization (FGR) with random start (RS) to reduce the
output sensitivity to the small variation of input. First of all,
instead of ‖x′ − x‖p, our method evaluate the variation by
directly calculate the degree of position flow, i.e., ‖v−v0‖p,
where v0 is the identity value so that x = I(x,v0), and
is able to model the pointwise slope of deformations. Sec-
ondly, random start technique is adopted to increase the abil-
ity of FGR to reflect the piecewise linear.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
below:
• In this paper, we analyze the defects of using ‖x′ − x‖p
to measure the variation of adversarial deformations, and
suggest to directly use ‖v − v0‖p instead;
• Based on ‖v − v0‖p, a flow gradient regularization with
random start is proposed to improve the resistance to ad-
versarial deformations. Theoretically, we prove that regu-
larizing flow gradients is able to acquire a tighter bound
than regularizing input gradients;
• Our experiments results consistently show that training
with FGR performs better than training with IGR (input
gradient regularization) with a large margin when against
deformations generated in four methods. Moreover, FGR
is better than adversarial training in optimization-based
and gradient-free attacks, while these two methods can
still be combined to improve resistance further;
• We discuss the ways to apply gradient regularization
methods against other types of attack, and give a unified
formulation of the problem.
Related Work
Adversarial Attacks
Since Szegedy et al. (2013) first noticed the existence of
adversarial examples, many methods have been proposed
for enhancing such attacks. Goodfellow et al. (2014) pro-
vided a linear explanation of adversarial examples and pro-
posed a single-step attack named Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM). Subsequently, some works have been done to ex-
pand it to multiple steps (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Ben-
gio 2016; Dong et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2017). Among them,
Projected Gradient Descend (PGD) proposed by Madry
et al. (2017) is the most typical and shows a strong at-
tack ability. Carlini and Wagner (Carlini and Wagner 2017)
proposed C&W attack, a powerful approach that regards
generating adversarial examples as an optimization prob-
lem. Some works (Xiao et al. 2018a; Song et al. 2018)
construct an adversary by generative adversarial networks.
Nowadays, building more aggressive and more diverse at-
tacks is still a hot topic (Chen et al. 2018; Ru et al. 2019;
Croce and Hein 2019; Croce and Hein 2020). Attacks men-
tioned above mostly adopt the same form to construct ad-
versarial examples, i.e., adding a crafted noise to the clean
image, and limiting ‖x′−x‖p to be a small value to guaran-
tee visual similarity. These attacks refer to as additive noise
attacks.
Besides additive noise attacks, there are some works per-
forming such chicaneries in different ways, and we collec-
tively call it as non-additive noise attacks. One typical is ad-
versarial deformations, which fools deep models by flow-
ing the position of each pixel in the input image. Xiao et
al. (2018b) first introduced this type of attack and proposed
stAdv to find a suitable adversary. Alaifari et al. (2018) pre-
sented a method to find similar adversarial examples with
a first-order optimizer. Zhang et al. (2019) combined both
spatial and pixel perturbations and proposed a joint adver-
sarial attack. In general, adversarial examples generated in
this way are more imperceptible for humans, and the resis-
tance of defenses designed for additive noise attacks cannot
be guaranteed.
The non-additive noise family also includes some other
attack methods. Engstrom et al. (2017) found that neural
networks are vulnerable to simple image transformations,
such as rotation and translation. Brown et al. (2017) created
universal, robust, targeted image patches that can fool clas-
sifiers in the real world. Sharif et al. (2016; 2017) fooled a
face recognition system by wearing elaborate glasses on face
images. Qiu et al. (2019) proposed SemanticAdv to gener-
ated adversarial examples by editing semantic information,
such as the color of hair. Afifi et al. (2019) explored that
incorrect white balance adjustment negatively impacts the
performance of DNNs.
The diversity in generating methods for adversarial sam-
ples imposes great challenges to the research on constructing
adversarial robust models.
Adversarial Defenses
To improve resistance of models to such attacks, extensive
efforts have come into the scene, such as preprocessing (Gu
and Rigazio 2014; Xie et al. 2017; Kou et al. 2019), fea-
ture squeezing (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017), model ensem-
ble (Trame`r et al. 2017; Sen, Ravindran, and Raghunathan
2020) and certified defenses (Raghunathan, Steinhardt, and
Liang 2018). The most direct and effective defenses so
far are training models with generated examples as a kind
of data augmentation. These adversarial training methods
are first introduced by Goodfellow et al. (2014) and devel-
oped by Madry et al. (2017). Subsequently, research con-
tinued to be presented. Some works (Shafahi et al. 2019;
Zhang et al. 2019) tried to decrease time consumption,
which is one of the major drawbacks of adversarial training.
Tramer and Boneh (Trame`r and Boneh 2019) developed it to
defense both l1, l2 and l∞ attacks simultaneously.
The main idea of another type of defenses is to decrease
the sensitivity of models’ output to a small variation of in-
put. Among them, the most typical methods are input gra-
dient regularization (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015; Ross and
Doshi-Velez 2018) and Jacobians regularization (Jakubovitz
and Giryes 2018), where both are adding penalty items to the
loss function during model training. Hoffman et al. (2019)
developed an efficient approximate algorithm to implement
Jacobians regularizer. Chan et al. (2019) proposed Jacobian
adversarially regularized network (JARN) to improve the
saliency of Jacobians, and further increase robustness.
These methods are mainly designed for additive noise at-
tacks, and their resistance to other types of attack are less ef-
fective. Engstrom et al. (2017) showed that l∞-bounded ad-
versarial training actually damages the accuracy of models
to adversarial rotations and translations. Xiao et al. (2018b)
tested different defenses against adversarial deformations
and found that these methods can only achieve low defense
performance.
How to defense non-additive attacks needs further re-
search.
Preliminaries
Adversarial Examples
Given a deep model f , the aim of attack methods is to find
an adversarial example x′ so that f(x′) 6= f(x) for un-
targeted attack or f(x′) = t for targeted attack. The most
common form is adding a crafted noise δ to the clean image
x, i.e., x′ = x + δ. After determining the form of attack,
researches mainly focus on how to find a suitable δ. In this
paper, we review four types, single-step attack, multi-step
attack, optimization-based attack, and gradient-free attack,
which are also used to generate adversarial deformations in
our experiments.
Single-step attack (FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2014)) uses a single gradient ascent step to con-
struct adversarial examples
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xL(x,y)), (1)
where L is the loss function, y is the one-hot groundtruth
label and  is a small value that specifying a noise budget.
Multi-step attack (BIM (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Ben-
gio 2016), PGD (Madry et al. 2017)) is an extension of
single-step that generating an adversary by iteratively cal-
culating
xk+1 = clip(xk + α · sign(∇xkL(xk,y))), (2)
where α is the step size, clip is the clip function to ensure
that xk+1 is within a reasonable range, x0 = x, x′ = xK
and K is the total number of iterations.
Optimization-based attack (L-BFGS (Szegedy et al.
2013), C&W (Carlini and Wagner 2017)) produces an ad-
versary for target t by minimizing the formulation
L(x+ δ, t) + c · ‖δ‖p, (3)
where c is a chosen constant that balancing the strength and
the imperceptibility.
Unlike the above three attacks, which all use gradient in-
formation, gradient-free attack (ZOO (Chen et al. 2017),
One Pixel (Su, Vargas, and Sakurai 2019)) only need the
classification confidence of models, and search δ by gradi-
ent estimation or evolutionary algorithm.
Adversarial Deformations
As shown in Figure 2, we briefly introduce adversarial de-
formations, a typical class of non-additive noise attacks. As-
suming the clean image x ∈ RW×H×C with width W ,
height H and C channels, g = {(mi, ni)}i=1,...,W×H ∈
RW×H×2 is a 2D grid to denote the location of each
pixel. Adversarial deformations fool deep models by defin-
ing a flow matrix to shift the location of each pixel, v =
{(∆mi,∆ni)}i=1,...,W×H ∈ RW×H×2. I is the bilinear
interpolation function, and the adversarial example is gen-
erated by x′ = I(x, g + v), where the i-th pixel of x’ is
calculated as below,
x′i =
∑
q∈NB(m′i,n′i)
xq(1− |m′i −mq|)(1− |n′i − nq|),
(4)
where m′i = mi + ∆mi, n
′
i = ni + ∆ni are the shifted lo-
cation, NB(m′i, n
′
i) are the indices of the 4-pixel neighbors
at location (m′i, n
′
i). In the following writing, we omit g and
use x′ = I(x,v) for simplicity.
Finding a feasible v is similar to finding δ in additive
noise attacks, and can be solved with the four methods men-
tioned above. For more details about adversarial deforma-
tions, please refer to (Xiao et al. 2018a; Alaifari, Alberti,
and Gauksson 2018).
Figure 2: The process of generating adversarial deforma-
tions.
Input Gradient Regularization
Input gradient regularization (Ross and Doshi-Velez 2018)
influences the training process by adding ‖∇xL(x,y)‖p as
the penalty item to reduce the sensitivity of output to the
input variation, i.e.,
Loss = L(x,y) + λ · ‖∇xL(x,y)‖q , (5)
where λ is a hyperparameter that controls the penalty
strength.
Adversarial Training
Adversarial training improves robustness by optimizing
arg min
θ
E(x,y)
[
max
‖δ‖p≤
Lθ(x+ δ,y)
]
, (6)
where θ is the network parameter.
Methodology
For a robust classifier, the output should be insensitive to
the small variation of input (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015;
Simon-Gabriel et al. 2019), where the key issue is how
to measure the small variation of input. Many methods
have been proposed to achieve the goal, like regulariz-
ing the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix of models
evaluated on the output data (Jakubovitz and Giryes 2018;
Hoffman, Roberts, and Yaida 2019). However, the lp-norm
distance in input space, i.e., ‖x′ − x‖p, used in the previ-
ous works is not entirely suitable for measuring adversarial
deformations.
In this section, we first elaborate some of the shortcom-
ings of ‖x′ − x‖p when measuring the small variation of
adversarial deformations and try to give some explanation
on the possible reasons. Then, a flow gradient regularization
with random start is proposed to improve the resistance of
models against such attacks.
Defects Analysis
There are some defects appear when utilizing ‖x′ − x‖p to
evaluate the deformations, as shown in Figure 1(a), where
the value is calculated along a random flow matrix and
the adversarial flow matrix generated by stAdv (Xiao et al.
2018b). The surface indicates the defects: (1) the rising rate
of ‖x′ − x‖p changes in different directions, and (2) local
distortions appear on the surface. One of the consequences
these might bring is that defenses based on ‖x′ − x‖p are
less effective in defending against adversarial deformations,
because a shorter direction exists to result in a large lp-norm
distance.
But why do these situations happens? Revisiting the form
of generating adversarial deformations, x′ = I(x,v), we
can acquire some clues. First of all, for the i-th pixel in the
image, the slope of |x′i − xi|, i.e., ∂|x
′
i−xi|
∂vi
, is decided by
the 4-pixel neighbors at location (m′i, n
′
i) (see Equation 4),
which is called pointwise slope. Namely, for different pixels,
the slope of I(x,v) is different, which causes ‖x′−x‖p has
a larger rising rate in some directions. Secondly, the cause
of surface distortions is that, with the change of v, for any
pixel, I(x,v) exhibits piecewise linear.
Figure 3: An example of I(x,v), where the red dots are x1
and x2, black dots are nearest neighbors, and x′i is generated
by linear interpolation controlled by vi between xi and one
of neighbors.
An example in 1D is shown in Figure 3 for a better expla-
nation about pointwise slope and piecewise linear. Consid-
ering x = [x1,x2] denotes the clean sample, x′ = [x′1,x
′
2]
denotes the adversarial instance, g = [g1 = 1, g2 = 2] de-
notes the normal location grid, and v = [v1,v2] denotes the
flow matrix. Pointwise slope means that when vi moving the
same distance, |x′i−xi| is different for each point. This leads
to a faster rising rate of ‖x′ − x‖p in some directions, such
as flowing {v1 : 0 → −1,v2 : 0 → 1} obviously causes a
greater ‖x′ − x‖p than {v1 : 0 → 1,v2 : 0 → −1}. Piece-
wise means for each point, |x′i − xi| is a piecewise linear
function, and eventually causes ‖x′ − x‖p to appear non-
linear, as {v1 : 0.5 → −0.5,v2 : −0.2 → 0.8} shown in
Figure 3.
In order to effectively defend against adversarial deforma-
tions, the method proposed in this paper is designed with the
above two characteristics considered.
Flow Gradient Regularization
First, we consider to evaluate the small variation by using
‖v − v0‖p instead of ‖x′ − x‖p, and derive that regulariz-
ing the flow gradients can improve the resistance against ad-
versarial deformations. Essentially, compared to input gra-
dient regularization, flow gradient regularization introduces
the modeling of the pointwise slope, and is able to obtain a
tighter bound.
The overall principle is that the output of models should
be insensitive to small variation of the input. Defining
L(x,y) as a loss of the model f , and x is the input image
and y is the one-hot groundtruth label respectively. Suppose
δL is a variation of the loss, that is
δL = |L(x′,y)− L(x,y)|. (7)
If taking ‖x′−x‖p as the variation metric, we can directly
perform Taylor expansion on L(x′,y) around point x, and
derive the form of input gradient regularization (Ross and
Doshi-Velez 2018). Instead, we use ‖v− v0‖p in this paper.
Substituting x′ = I(x,v) and x = I(x,v0) in to Equation
7, we can get
δL = |L(I(x,v),y)− L(I(x,v0),y)|. (8)
Approximating the loss function around v0 by the first-
order Taylor expansion and ignoring the higher order terms,
we can get
L(I(x,v),y) = L(I(x,v0),y) +∇v0L · (v − v0), (9)
where∇v0L is a short form for∇vL(I(x,v),y)|v=v0 .
Substituting it into Equation 8 gives
δL = |∇v0L · (v − v0)| ≤ ‖∇v0L‖q · ‖v − v0‖p, (10)
where the Hlder inequality is used and 1p +
1
q = 1.
The proposed method reduces the impact of input distur-
bance on the output by adding the flow gradients ‖∇v0L‖q
as a penalty term to the loss function, and the total loss is
Loss = L(x,y) + λ · ‖∇v0L(I(x,v),y)‖2q , (11)
where λ is a hyperparameter specifying the penalty strength,
and we set p = q = 2 in the following experiments.
FGR versus IGR
Next we explore the relationship between input gradients
‖∇xL(x,y)‖q and flow gradients ‖∇v0L‖q . According to
the chain rule, ‖∇v0L‖q can be written as
‖∇v0L‖q = ‖∇x′L(x′,y) · ∇v0I(x,v)‖q . (12)
Since ∇x′L(x′,y) is equivalent to ∇xL(x,y) in input
gradient regularization, we can get
‖∇v0L‖q = ‖∇xL(x,y) · ∇v0I(x,v)‖q
≤ ‖∇xL(x,y)‖q · ‖∇v0I(x,v)‖q
. (13)
Considering the derivative part, I satisfies Lipschitz con-
straint, that is, the norm of the derivative of I is bounded.
Let C = supx ‖∇v0I(x,v)‖q , then
‖∇v0L‖q ≤ C · ‖∇xL(x,y)‖q . (14)
Substitute it into equation 10
δL ≤ ‖∇v0L‖q · ‖v − v0‖p
≤ C · ‖∇xL(x,y)‖q · ‖v − v0‖p, (15)
which means that ‖∇v0L‖q is a tighter bound than‖∇xL(x,y)‖q . Therefore, theoretically, regularizing
‖∇v0L‖q can better resist adversarial deformations.
In fact, ∇v0I(x,v) models the pointwise slope.
Random Start Technique
A drawback is that ‖∇vL‖q is undefined at the intersection,
as an example shown in Figure 4. One consequence is, once
the v0 is determined, ‖∇v0L‖q is a constant, so it cannot
reflect the characteristic of piecewise linear. To alleviate this
problem, we add a random noise to v0, make it able to cross
the undefined point. An example of the problem and random
start technique (RS) is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: An example of random start technique used in this
paper.
The total loss with FGR and RS is
Loss = L(x,y) + λ · ‖∇v0+rL(I(x,v),y)‖2q , (16)
where r ∼ N (0, σ2) is a random noise.
Experiments
Setup
We conduct experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
(Krizhevsky and Hinton 2010) and MNIST (LeCun et al.
1990) using VGG-11 (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014) and
ResNet-18 (He et al. 2016). For all experiments, we use
SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9 and weight decay
of 5e-4. The batch size is set to 256, and the initial learning
rate is 0.1. For MNIST, the learning rate is dropped by 10 ev-
ery 10 epochs, and for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, it is dropped
by 10 after 40 and 60 epochs. The total training duration is
30 and 80 epochs respectively. We employ random cropping
as data augmentation, and all pixels are normalized to [0-1].
Besides, for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we also use random
flipping with probability set to 0.5.
All experiments are implemented with PyTorch (Paszke
et al. 2017) and run on a GeForce GTX 1080 Ti.
Attacks
All trained models are evaluated against adversarial de-
formations generated by four methods: single-step attack,
multi-step attack, optimization-based attack, and gradient-
free attack. Single-step and multi-step attacks are extending
FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) and PGD
(Madry et al. 2017) respectively. For the optimization-based
attack, we adopt stAdv (Xiao et al. 2018b), and solve the
problem with SGD. Evolution strategies (ES) (Rechenberg
1978) is used in gradient-free attack to find a suitable v that
fools DNNs.
Defenses
To test the proposed method, the following defenses are used
to train a deep model:
• Standard, training without any defense methods;
• AT-FGSM, adversarial training with examples generated
by l∞-bounded FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014), and setting  to 0.1 for MNIST, 0.01 for CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100;
• AT-PGD, adversarial training with examples generated by
l∞-bounded PGD (Madry et al. 2017), and setting  to
0.1 for MNIST, 0.01 for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, the
number of iterations is 7;
• IGR, training with input gradient regularization
(Ross and Doshi-Velez 2018), and setting λ to
{1000, 3000, 5000, 7000} for all datasets;
• FGR, training with flow gradient regularization, and set-
ting λ to {100, 400, 500, 1000} for all datasets;
• FGR+RS, training with flow gradient regularization and
random start, and setting the standard deviation σ of the
normal distribution to 0.01;
• FGR+RS+AT-PGD, combining FGR+RS and AT-PGD.
It should be noted that the selection of the above parame-
ters, one part is to refer to the previous literature (Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al. 2017), such as
7 iterations for AT-PGD, and the other part is to ensure that
all methods can acquire similar accuracy on clean images
for a fair comparison.
Results
Our experimental results on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and
MNIST against different adversarial deformations are
shown in Figure 6.
With similar accuracy on the clean set, training with FGR
is significantly better than training with IGR when against
adversarial deformations. Our results indicate, compared
with IGR, FGR can bring additional adversary accuracy im-
provements in all cases, which are 0.2%-10.6%-32.7% (min-
mean-max), 7.8%-16.2%-26.2%, and 4.4%-9.3%-18.9% on
MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. Simi-
larly, the improvements under different attacks are 0.2%-
7.0%-14.5%, 2.1%-9.3%-18.5%, 4.4%-16.5%-32.7% and
2.2%-15.2%-23.2% for single-step attack, multi-step attack,
optimization-based attack and gradient-free attack respec-
tively. Relatively speaking, FGR improves more on stronger
adversarial attacks.
Random start can improve the effect of FGR without
(or slightly) affecting the accuracy in clean images. In our
experiments, the adversary accuracy improvements are -
3.4-3.2%-23.6%, 0.2%-3.7%-11.9%, 0.2%-2.8%-10.6% for
MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. For differ-
ent attacks, the improvements are 0.2%-1.8%-5.8%, 0.3%-
2.4%-6.8%, -0.2%-3.2%-23.6% and -3.4%-5.5%-14.9% for
single-step attack, multi-step attack, optimization-based at-
tack and gradient-free attack respectively. In all experiments,
the average accuracy loss on clean images is 0.1%, which is
almost negligible.
(a) SS (b) MS, K = 20
(c) SS (d) MS, K = 20
Figure 5: Performances of defenses in resisting single-
step (SS) and multi-step (MS) attacks with different  on
CIFAR-10 and MNIST. (a)-(b): CIFAR-10, VGG-11. (c)-
(d): MNIST, VGG-11. The results of CIFAR-100 are similar
to CIFAR-10.
FGR and adversarial training have their own advantages.
In general, adversarial training is better at resisting single-
step and multi-step attacks, and models trained with FGR
get stronger resistance to optimization-based and gradient-
free attacks. We argue this is because in adversarial train-
ing, samples are generated through single-step or multi-step
methods, so trained models will be somewhat “overfitting”
to the two types of attack. Relatively, FGR belongs to gra-
dient regularization and does not need to know in advance
what optimization method to attack.
We count the number of optimal resistance obtained by
different defense methods in Figure 6. For a fair compari-
son, for defenses with multiple instances, such as IGR and
FGR, we select the point with the closest accuracy to AT-
PGD on clean images. The results are shown in Table 1.
Generally speaking, the combination of FGR+RS and AT-
PGD can bring the best resistance to deep models.
In addition to the above experiments, we also test the per-
formances of defense methods in resisting single-step and
multi-step attacks with different budget , as shown in Figure
5. Consistent with previous observations, AT-PGD performs
better than FGR when against single-step and multi-step at-
tacks. Moreover, the gap between the two methods decreases
as the number of iterations increases. Except for the single-
step attack on MNIST, combining the two defenses can bring
the best results.
(a) SS,  = 0.01 (b) MS,  = 0.01, K = 20 (c) SGD (d) ES
(e) SS,  = 0.01 (f) MS,  = 0.01, K = 20 (g) SGD (h) ES
(i) SS,  = 0.01 (j) MS,  = 0.01, K = 20 (k) SGD (l) ES
(m) SS,  = 0.01 (n) MS,  = 0.01, K = 20 (o) SGD (p) ES
(q) SS,  = 0.02 (r) MS,  = 0.02, K = 20 (s) SGD (t) ES
(u) SS,  = 0.02 (v) MS,  = 0.02, K = 20 (w) SGD (x) ES
Figure 6: Results on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and MNIST against adversarial deformations. (a)-(d): CIFAR-10, VGG-11. (e)-
(h): CIFAR-10, ResNet-18. (i)-(l): CIFAR-100, VGG-11. (m)-(p): CIFAR-100, ResNet-18. (q)-(t): MNIST, VGG-11. (u)-(x):
MNIST, ResNet-18. SS: single-step attack. MS: multi-step attack.
Table 1: Statistics of defenses that achieve the best resistance
in the experimental results.
MNIST C10 C100 TOTAL
AT-FGSM 0 0 0 0
AT-PGD 3 0 0 3
IGR 0 0 0 0
FGR 0 0 0 0
FGR+RS 0 2 6 8
FGR+RS+AT-PGD 5 6 2 13
Loss Landscape
The classification loss values are computed along the adver-
sarial flow direction and a random flow direction to analyze
the loss landscape of the models trained with different de-
fense methods, as shown in 7
Compared with standard training, both IGR, FGR and ad-
versarial training can make the amplitudes lower. This shows
that all defenses can reduce the sensitivity of models’ output
to a small variation of input, and is consistent with the results
in Figure 6.
However, the landscape changes in these defenses be-
have differently. Unlike FGR, where the landscape is almost
smooth everywhere, the loss surface of IGR is still rugged in
some areas. The main reason for this is that ‖x′−x‖p is not
entirely suitable for the variation generated by adversarial
deformations. Random start can make the edge of FGR more
smooth. In general, combing FGR and adversarial training
can achieve the best results in both smoothness and ampli-
tude.
Generalization of Gradient Regularization
Both FGR and IGR belong to the special form of gradient
regularization. The main difference between them is how
to measure the variation between adversarial examples and
clean examples, where the former adopts ‖v − x0‖p and is
designed for adversarial deformations, and the latter adopts
‖x′ − x‖p is designed for additive noise attacks.
But what should we do if encountering new types of
attack? We discuss this important issue in this section. Ac-
cording to the above work and the observation of previous
attacks, we try to expand IGR and FGR to a more gen-
eral form. Many attacks, including additive noise and non-
additive noise, can be represented into a unified form. Given
a clean input image x, the adversarial image x′ can be gen-
erated by x′ = τ(x,n), where τ is a modification function,
n is the parameter of τ that controls the imposed change, n0
is the identity value so that x = τ(x,n0). Before showing
how to represent different types of attack as τ , we first define
some symbols for convenience:
• I - bilinear interpolation function;
• A - pointwise affine transformation function;
• G - generative neural networks;
• m - a mask of input image size.
(a) Standard (b) AT-PGD
(c) IGR, λ = 3000 (d) FGR, λ = 400
(e) FGR, λ = 400+RS (f) FGR, λ = 400+RS+AT-
PGD
Figure 7: Loss surfaces along the adversarial flow and a ran-
dom flow on CIFAR-10 with VGG-11.
Some forms of attack are summarized in Table 2.
After obtaining a unified form, substituting x′ = τ(x,n)
and x = τ(x,n0) into equation 7, we can get
δL = |L(τ(x,n),y)− L(τ(x,n0),y)|. (17)
Following similar steps as FGR, we can finally get a uni-
fied form of gradient regularization
Loss = L(x,y) + λ · ‖∇n0L(τ(x,n),y)‖2q , (18)
where FGR and IGR are special forms when τ(x,n) =
I(x,n), n = v and τ(x,n) = x+ n, n = δ respectively.
For some other forms of attacks, the same method can be
used to derive the corresponding regularization.
Conclusion
In order to increase the resistance of DNNs against adver-
sarial deformations, a typical type of non-additive attacks,
we propose a defense method named flow gradient regular-
ization, which can model the characteristics of adversarial
deformations. Besides, to better adapt to the piecewise lin-
earity, we introduce a random start into flow gradient regu-
larization.
Table 2: Summary of different forms of attack.
Methods τ(x,n) n
Additive Noise Attacks (Madry et al. 2017; Carlini and Wagner 2017) x′ = x+ n Additive Noise, δ
Multiplicative Noise Attack (Yang and Ji 2019) x′ = x · n Multiplicative Noise
Adversarial Patches (Eykholt et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2018) x′ = x+m · n Additive Noise
Adversarial Deformations (Xiao et al. 2018b; Zhang and Wang 2019) x′ = I(x,n) Flow Matrix, v
Affine Attacks (Engstrom et al. 2017; Zhao et al. 2019) x′ = I(x,A(n)) Affine Matrix
Semantic Attacks (Joshi et al. 2019; Qiu et al. 2019) x′ = G(x,n) Attribute Vector
The proposed defenses are evaluated on MNIST, CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 against adversarial deformations gener-
ated by four methods, i.e., single-step attack, multi-step at-
tack, optimization-based attack and gradient-free attack. The
experimental results consistently show that, compared with
IGR, models trained with FGR can get better resistance with
a large margin. The comparison with adversarial training in-
dicates that FGR is more suitable for resisting optimization-
based and gradient-free attacks. Moreover, these two meth-
ods can be combined to improve models’ robustness further.
Finally, a unified form of gradient regularization is dis-
cussed and both IGR and FGR are two special cases. Such a
unified form can be used to derive the corresponding specific
instance when facing other types of attack.
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